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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
 
Joseph Fornarotto appeals from the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of his employer, New Jersey- 
American Water Company. The district court ruled that this 
suit under ERISA was barred under New Jersey's entire 
controversy doctrine because Fornarotto's previously filed 
tort action was sufficiently related to the instant action to 
trigger application of that doctrine. For the reasons that 
follow we will reverse and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
Fornarotto was employed by the New Jersey-American 
Water Company (a subsidiary of American Waterworks 
Company, Inc.) for nearly 30 years, from March 7, 1966 
until January 23, 1995. As a New Jersey-American 
employee, Fornarotto was eligible to participate in the 
company's pension plan which provided different levels of 
benefits to eligible employees, depending upon the 
circumstances under which they stopped working for the 
company. Those benefits include disability retirement 
benefits, if, inter alia, the employee becomes disabled and 
is "unable permanently to engage in any occupation or 
employment for compensation or profit." App. at 24. 
 
On April 8, 1990, Fornarotto's union was on strike. He 
was walking a picket line when he was struck by an 
automobile driven by Michael Chiapetta, who was also a 
New Jersey-American employee.1 Fornarotto was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Fornarotto claimed that Chiapetta was acting in the course of his 
employment at the time of the accident. 
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hospitalized for approximately 10 days in cervical and 
lumbar traction. After his discharge, he underwent a course 
of physical therapy for his neck, back and knee. In June of 
1990, he underwent arthroscopic surgery on his knee, and 
began a new course of physical therapy. 
 
On June 11, 1990, Fornarotto filed a personal injury 
action against Chiapetta, and New Jersey-American, in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth 
County. Fornarotto v. Chiapetta and New Jersey-American 
Waterworks, Co., No. MON-L-54564-90. Thereafter, 
Fornarotto returned to work at New Jersey-American. 
However, he soon experienced additional problems with his 
knee, and began experiencing severe headaches. In March 
of 1992, he had a second arthroscopic surgery on his knee 
and was continuing to suffer severe headaches that first 
began after the accident. Fornarotto continued with 
physical therapy until May of 1992 when he was admitted 
to the hospital and again put in traction. He was released 
after about a week, but his rehabilitation did not go well, 
and he eventually needed back surgery. His physical 
problems persisted even after that surgery, and as a result 
of the lingering effects of his injuries, he had problems 
concentrating, sitting, standing, lifting or bending, and was 
unable to engage in any activity for more than a short 
period of time. He applied for disability benefits under his 
employer's benefits plan, but his requests for disability 
benefits were denied, and his final appeal from that 
decision was rejected on May 8, 1995. Fornarotto has not 
worked since January 23, 1993, and claims that he has 
been totally disabled since then. 
 
On September 5, 1995, Fornarotto filed a complaint in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth 
County, against American Waterworks and New Jersey- 
American Waterworks under the civil enforcement 
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking disability 
benefits by reason of being disablied by the injuries he 
sustained in the automobile accident.2  On October 27, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts for 
actions by an ERISA participant under 29 U.S.C.S 1132(a)(1)(B). 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(e)(1). 
 
                                3 
  
1995, the defendants removed the ERISA action to federal 
district court in New Jersey. In November of 1996, 
Fornarotto's state court personal injury action was settled 
for $450,000, and a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice 
was filed. Shortly thereafter, on February 7, 1997, 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in 
Fornarotto's removed ERISA action. They alleged that the 
ERISA action arose from the same set of facts as 
Fornarotto's personal injury action and was therefore 
barred by New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine. The 
district court agreed and granted defendants' summary 
judgment motion. This appeal followed.3  
 
II. 
 
The "entire controversy doctrine seeks to assure that all 
aspects of a legal dispute occur in a single lawsuit." Olds v. 
Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (N.J. 1997). Although res 
judicata principles and New Jersey's entire controversy 
doctrine are "blood relatives," the latter is New Jersey's 
"specific, and idiosyncratic, application of traditional res 
judicata principles." Rycoline Products, Inc. v. C & W 
Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997). The doctrine 
encompasses traditional concepts of claims joinder as well 
as party joinder, Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d at 637, though 
cases involving the latter predominate. 
 
       The fundamental principle behind the inclusion policy 
       of the entire controversy doctrine is that the 
       adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one 
       litigation in one court; accordingly, all parties involved 
       in a litigation should at the very least present in that 
       proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are 
       related to the underlying controversy. 
 
Venuto v Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 761 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
 
"The objectives behind the doctrine are threefold: (1) to 
encourage the comprehensive and conclusive determination 
of a legal controversy; (2) to achieve party fairness . . . and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We subject the district court's grant of summary judgment to the 
defendants to plenary review. Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.3d 
335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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(3) to promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding 
fragmented, multiple and duplicative litigation." Id. The 
doctrine is a "basic concept of judicial administration that 
is of constitutional dimension," viz., N.J. Const. (1947), art. 
IV, S 3, P 4.4 DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 
1995). 
 
The rule evolved from common law concerns of joinder, 
and efficiency, but has since been codified and finds its 
current expression in Rule 4:30A of the New Jersey Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
 
       Non-joinder of claims or parties required to be joined 
       by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the 
       preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required 
       by the entire controversy doctrine, except as otherwise 
       provided by R. 4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R. 
       4:67-4(a) (leave required for counterclaims or cross- 
       claims in summary actions).5 
 
However, as is true with the infamous "rule against 
perpetuities", the entire controversy doctrine is easily 
recited, but often deceptively elusive and problematic in 
application.6 This is because it is often difficult to define the 
parameters of "a legal controversy" or "one litigation" with 
the precision suggested by the doctrine. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The constitutional provision reads: 
 
       Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the 
       Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of 
       the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal 
and 
       equitable relief should be granted in any cause so that all matters 
       in controversy between the parties may be completely determined. 
 
5. For a discussion of the origins and evolution of the doctrine see Olds, 
696 A.2d at 636 et seq. 
 
6. The Rule Against Perpetuities was given its classic expression by John 
Chipman Gray and reads: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at 
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest." GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES S 201 (2d 
ed. 
1906). One commentator has said that as law students "we struggle with 
it and make a little headway." John W. Weaver, Fear and Loathing in 
Perpetuities, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1393 (1991). However, it is only 
later that we realize that "[n]ot only does no one understand the Rule, no 
one's really expected to." Id. 
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       In determining whether successive claims constitute 
       one controversy for purposes of the [entire controversy] 
       doctrine, the central question is whether the claims 
       against the different parties arise from related facts or 
       the same transaction or series of transactions. It is the 
       core set of facts that provides the link between distinct 
       claims against the same or different parties and 
       triggers the requirement that they be determined in 
       one proceeding. One measure of whether distinct 
       claims are part of an entire controversy is whether 
       parties have a significant interest in the disposition of 
       a particular claim, one that may materially affect or be 
       materially affected by the disposition of that claim. The 
       test for whether claims are "related" such that they 
       must be brought in a single action under the New 
       Jersey entire controversy doctrine . . . [is] as follows: if 
       parties or persons will, after final judgment is entered, 
       be likely to have to engage in additional litigation to 
       conclusively dispose of their respective bundles of 
       rights and liabilities that derive from a single 
       transaction or related series of transactions, the 
       omitted components of the dispute or controversy must 
       be regarded as constituting an element of one 
       mandatory unit of litigation. 
 
DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d at 501 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). However, the current appeal illustrates 
the difficulty that courts can encounter when attempting to 
determine when the "relationship" of the "core facts" 
implicates the doctrine, or when successive law suits 
constitute "a single transaction or series of transactions." 
For although Fornarotto's tort claim and his ERISA claim 
share the common fact of his injuries, the relationship of 
the parties and successive claims is such that we conclude 
that those suits do not constitute "a single transaction". 
This action is therefore not barred by the entire controversy 
doctrine. 
 
An examination of the facts in DiTrolio v. Antiles is 
instructive. There, a physician, DiTrolio, was denied staff 
privileges at a hospital, and he sued the hospital and its 
board of trustees challenging the procedures used to deny 
him a position on the hospital's staff. The gravamen of that 
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suit was that the four physicians who comprised the 
urology department, who were all in competition with him, 
had improperly caused the hospital to deny his application. 
A mere six days after DiTrolio entered into the settlement 
agreement that ended that litigation, he brought a second 
action against those four physicians whose conduct had 
formed the basis of his suit against the hospital. The trial 
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the second 
suit under the entire controversy doctrine for failure to join 
them in the first action. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
agreed. The court concluded that the fatal flaw in the 
second suit was plaintiff's failure to join the four physicians 
as parties in the first action. Id. at 508. 
 
Here, we are concerned with Fornarotto's failure to join 
claims, not parties, but that distinction does not alter the 
substance of our analysis. In DiTrolio, the court stated that 
the "determinative consideration is whether the distinct 
claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because 
they arise from interrelated facts. . . . [T]he same set of 
facts can give rise to discrete causes of action and different 
kinds of relief." 662 A.2d at 503. The court focused on the 
circumstances underlying the second suit. 
 
       [A] controversy between or among persons that arises 
       from a core set of related factual circumstances may 
       trigger different claims against different parties. It is 
       this commonality of facts, rather than commonality of 
       issues, parties or remedies that defines the scope of the 
       controversy and implicates the joinder requirements of 
       the entire controversy doctrine. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Here, absent the injuries that gave 
rise to Fornarotto's tort claim, he would not have become 
disabled and sought the disability benefits he sued for in 
this ERISA proceeding. Nevertheless, this similarity does 
not rise to the level of "commonality of facts" necessary to 
trigger the entire controversy doctrine. See Joel v. Morocco, 
680 A.2d 1036 (N.J., 1997). 
 
In Joel, the court stated the issue as follows: "The 
essential question is whether a party making a judicial 
challenge to zoning approvals granted to a partnership 
must name in that land-use suit the individual partners in 
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the partnership as a precondition to later enforcement of a 
money settlement against the partners." Id. The court then 
discussed recent cases and concluded that the doctrine did 
not require joinder under those circumstances. "The 
assertion of the personal claims against the partners was 
not at all necessary to the `comprehensive and conclusive' 
determination of the underlying legal controversy in the 
land-use case." Id. at 1039. Therefore, failure to include the 
individual partners in the settlement agreement with the 
partnership did not preclude the plaintiff from suing those 
partners individually after the first action was settled. That 
is our situation here. "There were two separate actions, not 
two causes of action arising from the same transactional 
facts." Id. at 1040. The liability of the partners in Joel v. 
Morrocco was governed by the Uniform Partnership law, not 
the law of land use that governed resolution of the zoning 
dispute. The second suit was therefore unlike cases where 
a subsequent suit "would have necessitated a rerun of the 
first case to determine [liability in the second suit]" Id. at 
1037. The entire controversy doctrine "is easily recognized 
in the context of the calculated fragmentation of litigation." 
Id. Here, there is no such fragmentation. 
 
Fornarotto's personal injury action was grounded in 
traditional negligence, thus issues of fault, duty, causation, 
agency, and contributory negligence controlled. None of 
those issues is relevant to his ERISA action. The issues 
here involve an employer's obligation to pay disability 
compensation under the provisions of a pension plan. Even 
if the employer and Chiapetta, the driver of the car that 
struck Fornarotto, both prevailed in the state court tort 
action, the defendant-employer would be no better off here 
so long as Fornarotto could establish he was "disabled" 
under defendant's plan.7 Accordingly, we conclude that the 
link between this action and the prior action is too 
attenuated to hold that both actions arise from a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. New Jersey-American argues that Fornarotto will receive the "windfall" 
of a double recovery if he is allowed to collect on his ERISA claim and 
retain the previously bargained-for settlement proceeds. However, the 
district court can address that concern if Fornarotto prevails on remand. 
That court can then consider this argument and resolve it in context 
with the employer's obligation under its pension plan. 
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"commonality of facts." The relationship of the two suits is 
rooted more in serendipity and coincidence than 
commonality of facts. Fornarotto's ERISA claim does not 
"constitute one or more of the bundle of rights and 
liabilities which derive from the . . . tortfeasor-injured 
person relationship of plaintiff and defendant which should 
be disposed of in one unit of litigation." Chiacchio v. 
Chiacchio, 486 A.2d 335, 338, (N.J. Super. A.D. 1984) 
 
Fornorotto's first suit and his second suit do not turn on 
the "same transactional facts." Joel, 688 A.2d at 1037. 
Accordingly, we hold that the entire controversy doctrine 
was not implicated by the failure to join the ERISA claim 
with the prior tort claim. The two claims are separate and 
distinct, and failure to join them does not require a "rerun" 
of the preceding state litigation nor does this suit allow 
Fornarotto to "seek two bites at the apple." Joel, at 1040. 
 
III. 
 
Fornarotto concedes that his personal injury action and 
his ERISA action arise from the same set of facts, i.e., his 
automobile accident. In Illiano v. Seaview Orthopedics, 690 
A.2d 662 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1997), Illiano suffered back 
injuries when his car was struck by a car driven by Gilbert. 
Apparently, Gilbert's negligence was not at issue and only 
damages were contested. Illiano was treated for the injury 
by Dr. Lospinuso, a principal of Seaview Orthopedics.8 
Eventually, Illiano's counsel filed a personal injury action 
against Gilbert. However, for some unknown reason, 
Lospinuso repeatedly and erroneously reported, as part of 
Illiano's medical history, that Illiano's back injury was 
either work-related or related to a car accident that 
occurred later than the Gilbert accident. 
 
Lospinuso refused to correct his report in spite of several 
requests by Illiano's counsel to do so. Not unexpectedly, 
Lospinuso's erroneous reports "were devastating to 
[Illiano's] pending action against Gilbert," Id. at 664, and 
Illiano was forced to accept an unfavorable settlement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Ironically, Lospinuso is also one of Fornarotto's treating physicians. 
See App. at p. 36. 
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In the meantime, Illiano's automobile insurance carrier 
refused to pay Lospinuso's bill because his medical reports 
did not relate Illiano's treatment to the Gilbert accident. 
Ultimately, after Lospinuso realized that his erroneous 
reports were the reason the carrier was not paying his bill, 
he reviewed his records and, in 1992, wrote a letter to 
Illiano and Illiano's insurance carrier correcting the error. 
However, the letter was too late to assist Illiano in his 
negligence action because he had already accepted the 
settlement. 
 
Consequently, Illiano sued Lospinuso and Seaview 
Orthopedics, claiming that Lospinuso's refusal to correct 
his medical reports during the pendency of the Gilbert suit 
resulted in the loss of the true value of his claim against 
Gilbert. Lospinuso moved for summary judgment 
contending, inter alia, that the claim against him should 
have been joined to the Gilbert personal injury case and 
was therefore barred by the entire controversy doctrine. The 
trial court granted Lospinuso's motion, finding that the 
entire controversy doctrine did bar Illiano's suit against 
Lospinuso. 
 
The New Jersey appellate court reversed, finding that the 
Lospinuso claim was "not a constituent component of the 
transaction giving rise to the claim against Gilbert." Id. at 
666. The appellate court wrote: 
 
       The subject of the . . . first suit here was a routine 
       automobile accident personal-injury case. [Lospinuso] 
       had nothing to do with giving rise to that cause of 
       action. The claims made against [Lospinuso] by [Illiano] 
       arising out of his conduct during the litigation had no 
       causal nexus with [Illiano's] claim against [Gilbert]. In 
       short, the Lospinuso claim, in our view, is simply not 
       fairly characterizable as a constituent component of 
       [Illiano's] claim against Gilbert. It is rather a separate 
       and tangential controversy arising out of an altogether 
       different relationship having its own set of 
       responsibilities and obligations. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The court further noted that when joinder has been 
required, it has been "because the claims against [the 
 
                                10 
  
defendants] in the successive actions were constituent 
claims arising out of the same transaction that was the 
gravamen of the first suit against others." Id. The 
transaction that gave rise to the second suit there was not 
the gravamen of the first suit. We believe the same rationale 
applies here. Although Fornarotto's automobile accident 
triggered both the personal injury claim and his disability 
pension claim, thus providing a "causal nexus," the 
personal injury action is not a constituent component of 
the ERISA action. The ERISA action "aris[es] out of an 
altogether different relationship having its own set of 
responsibilities and obligations," from the personal injury 
action. The doctrine does not require an identity of legal 
issues. Joel, at 1038. However, the issues in a successive 
suit must be such that the suit is a "consistent component" 
of the prior claim. Illiano, 690 A.2d at 666. That is not the 
case here, and we conclude the doctrine doesn't apply. 
 
A similar result was reached in Chiacchio v. Chiacchio, 
486 A.2d 335 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1984). There, plaintiff/wife 
filed a two-count complaint -- count one was in divorce on 
grounds of extreme cruelty and count two was in tort to 
recover damages for personal injuries as a result of being 
shot and strangled by defendant/husband. Husband 
notified his homeowner's carrier, which denied coverage. 
Husband then filed a motion to join the carrier as a third- 
party defendant. The motion was granted and the carrier 
was not only joined as a third-party defendant, but was 
also ordered to provide a defense in the underlying action 
and to pay for any judgment obtained by wife against 
husband to the extent of its coverage. The carrier then filed 
an answer to the third-party complaint and a counterclaim 
for a declaratory judgment as to the coverage issue. The 
carrier also moved to vacate the order. The trial court 
vacated its prior order except for the joinder of the carrier 
as a third-party defendant and further ordered that all 
issues raised by the complaint, third-party complaint and 
the declaratory judgment counterclaim should be joined in 
the pending action. Finally, the trial court granted the wife 
permission to file an amended complaint setting forth a 
claim for PIP benefits under an automobile policy issued by 
the same carrier. 
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The carrier filed an interlocutory appeal contending, inter 
alia, that the entire controversy doctrine did not require 
that the issues relating to coverage and PIP benefits be 
joined in the matrimonial-tort action. The appellate court 
agreed stating: 
 
       The third-party complaint and [the carrier's] 
       counterclaim do not involve common questions of fact 
       or law with those raised in the complaint. Plaintiff 
       seeks a dissolution of the marriage, equitable 
       distribution of the marital assets and damages for 
       injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's 
       wrongdoing, whereas the amended complaint, third- 
       party complaint and counterclaim present issues 
       relating to the insurance coverage afforded by [the 
       carrier's] policies. These claims do not have the 
       commonality required for a joinder under [the rules 
       relating to third-party practice]. Nor do they constitute 
       one or more of the bundle of rights and liabilities which 
       derive from the husband-wife or tortfeasor-injured 
       person relationship of plaintiff and defendant which 
       should be disposed of in one unit of litigation. 
 
Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added). Just as Fornarotto's ERISA 
action is not a "constituent component" of his personal 
injury action, his ERISA action does not "constitute . . . the 
[same] bundle of rights and liabilities which derive from the 
. . . tortfeasor-injured person relationship . . . which should 
be disposed of in one unit of litigation." 
 
IV. 
 
In addition, even if the language of the doctrine could be 
stretched to cover the ERISA claim, we conclude that it was 
error for the district court to rely on the doctrine under 
these circumstances. Despite the doctrine's apparent 
rigidity, New Jersey courts have clearly stated that it is not 
to be applied in a rigid manner divorced from concepts of 
equity and fairness. "[P]arty fairness is critical in the 
application of the doctrine." Cogdell v. Hospital Center at 
Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1177 (N.J. 1989). "Equitable 
considerations can relax mandatory-joinder requirements 
when joinder would be unfair." Id., at 1041. (internal 
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quotations omitted). Indeed, "[t]he polestar of the 
application of the rule is judicial `fairness' ". DiTrolio, 662 
A.2d at 504. Strict application of the doctrine here was 
simply not fair. 
 
A "fairness" inquiry under the entire controversy doctrine 
has a specific focus: "Fairness, in the context of party 
joinder, focuses on basic fairness to all of the parties, 
especially those sued in the second suit who were 
prevented from participating in the first." Id. "Fairness is 
thus a protective concept that focuses primarily on whether 
defendants would be in a better position to defend 
themselves if the claims against them had been raised and 
asserted in the first litigation." Id. at 505. A key 
determination is whether the defendants "are now 
disadvantaged because they were not parties to thefirst 
litigation." Id. 
 
Here, Fornarotto's employer was a defendant in both the 
personal injury action and the ERISA action. It knew early 
on that Fornarotto was claiming that he was disabled. In 
fact, the employer argues throughout its brief that 
Fornarotto's disability is the key issue in both the personal 
injury action and the ERISA action. 
 
       In both cases, [Fornarotto] seeks to recover damages 
       arising out of his alleged disability caused by injuries 
       suffered in the same auto accident. Moreover, the same 
       set of facts that were relevant in the [personal injury 
       action] with respect to the determination whether 
       [Fornarotto] was disabled and unable to work, and 
       therefore entitled to recover damages for lost wages, 
       are necessarily implicated in the [ERISA action]. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 8-9. Thus, the employer is in the same 
position to defend itself in this suit as it was in the 
personal injury action. Failure to join the ERISA claim in 
the initial state action would cause some redundancy, thus 
causing New Jersey-American some inconvenience, but that 
inconvenience does not rise to the level of prejudice or 
unfairness requiring application of the doctrine. Moreover, 
as will be noted below, some of the redundancy and 
inconvenience here is the direct result of New Jersey- 
American's tactical decision to remove the then pending 
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state ERISA action to federal court where it could no longer 
be consolidated with the state tort action. 
 
Moreover, "[f]airness to the plaintiff must also be 
considered." DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 505. In analyzing this 
prong of the fairness inquiry, New Jersey courts have 
usually focused upon whether the plaintiff had an 
opportunity to assert the barred claim in the initial 
litigation. In Cogdell, the court noted that joinder under the 
entire controversy doctrine was not required unless the 
"plaintiff had sufficient information to have included these 
defendants in the earlier lawsuit." 560 A.2d at 1169. 
Similarly, the court has also noted "the party whose claim 
is being sought to be barred must have had a fair and 
reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in 
the original action." Cafferata v. Peyser, 597 A.2d 1101, 
1104 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991). Here, Fornorotto's initial 
personal injury claim was filed before he knew that he 
would be denied disability benefits from his employer. 
Although he could have sought to amend his complaint 
when he learned his employer would not pay disability 
benefits under his pension, we do not think that fact tilts 
the scales of fairness toward New Jersey American's side of 
this dispute. 
 
Fornarotto worked for New Jersey-American Water 
Company for twenty-nine years. App. at 35. During those 
twenty-nine years he contributed a portion of his earnings 
to the pension plan from which he now seeks disability 
benefits. That pension was an integral part of his 
employment contract, and he has paid for that pension 
with his labor over the years. There is nothing on this 
record to suggest that Fornarotto was anything other than 
a good employee, and North-American has not suggested 
anything to the contrary. Moreover, even if it had, it would 
be unlikely that a subpar job performance would cause an 
employee to forfeit his pension. Accordingly, we do not 
understand how fairness is served by precluding Fornarotto 
from attempting to establish his entitlement to his disability 
pension. 
 
Furthermore, Fornarotto's personal injury action and his 
ERISA action are separate and distinct causes of action. He 
has not split a single cause of action in two actions. His 
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case is unlike Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 476 A.2d 
250 (N.J. 1984), where plaintiff, who first brought an 
automobile accident case, deliberately withheld a defective 
design claim against the automobile's manufacturer, and 
unlike Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169 
(N.J. 1989), where plaintiffs first sued physicians for birth 
injuries to an infant and subsequently sued the hospital 
and its staff for the same injuries. Fornarotto has not 
engaged in "calculated fragmentation of litigation" nor did 
he "for strategic reasons withheld claims concerning the 
underlying controversy . . . seek[ing] two bites at the apple." 
Joel, 688 A.2d at 1041. 
 
These considerations would, in and of themselves, 
establish the unfairness of rigidly applying the entire 
controversy doctrine here. However, there is more. The 
defendants removed the ERISA claim from state to federal 
court. Had the claim remained in state court, it would, in 
all probability, have been joined with the then pending 
personal injury action. New Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure 
4:5-1(b)(2), that was adopted to implement the entire 
controversy doctrine, see Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, 
Comment R. 4:5-1 (1993), imposes a continuing obligation 
on litigants to notify the trial court of any other pending or 
anticipated litigation. It provides: 
 
       Each party shall include with the first pleading a 
       certification as to whether the matter in controversy is 
       the subject of any other action pending in any court or 
       of a pending arbitration proceeding, or whether any 
       other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated; 
       and, if so, the certification shall identify such actions 
       and all parties thereto. Further, each party shall 
       disclose in the certification the names of any other 
       party who should be joined in the action. Each party 
       shall have a continuing obligation during the course of 
       the litigation to file and serve on all other parties and 
       with the court an amended certification if there is a 
       change in the facts stated in the original certification. 
       The court may compel the joinder of parties in 
       appropriate circumstances, either upon its own motion 
       or that of a party. 
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Rule 4:5-1(b)(2). When Fornarotto's ERISA complaint was 
filed, it contained a Rule 4:5-1 certification which recited, 
inter alia, that the "matter in controversy is not subject to 
any other pending or contemplated court action or 
arbitration. . . ." App. at 3. Whether that statement 
remained accurate or not is immaterial. Had the employer 
filed an answer to the ERISA complaint in the New Jersey 
court, it would have been required to file its own Rule 4:5-1 
certification. That certification would have informed the 
court that, in its opinion, the ERISA action was related to 
a pending court action, i.e., the personal injury action. The 
matters could then have been consolidated by the state trial 
courts. "It is the trial court's responsibility to determine 
whether or not joinder is appropriate in a given case, and 
thus litigants should be compelled to bring all actions at 
one time . . . . The trial court is vested with the discretion 
to sever or stay an inappropriate consolidation." DiTrolio, 
662 A.2d at 506. However, New Jersey-American did not file 
an answer to Fornarotto's ERISA complaint. Instead, it 
removed the ERISA action to the district court and then, 
after it settled Fornarotto's personal injury action, moved to 
dismiss the ERISA action under the entire controversy 
doctrine.9 By removing the action to federal court and then 
filing a motion to dismiss after the personal injury action 
was settled, the employer's counsel clearly out maneuvered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. At oral argument, we were informed that there is an exchange of 
letters between counsel for Fornarotto and counsel who represented the 
employer in the personal injury action, who, we note, are not the 
employer's counsel in this case, concerning the wording of the release for 
the settlement of the personal injury action. Those letters could be read 
as indicating that there was an agreement whereby Fornarotto reserved 
his rights to proceed in his ERISA action despite having released the 
employer in the personal injury action. Those letters were apparently 
attached as exhibits to the summary judgment motion, but for reasons 
we cannot understand, the issue of Fornarotto's reservation of rights was 
never argued to the district court. Normally, we would reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the reservation of rights. However, because we 
believe that the entire controversy doctrine should not be applied to bar 
Fornarotto's ERISA action, it is not necessary to remand for a 
determination as to whether there was in fact a reservation of rights to 
proceed in the ERISA action. 
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Fornarotto by not having to alert the state court to the need 
to consolidate the matters. Defense counsel thereby kept 
the entire controversy arrow poised to strike at the ERISA 
action following its removal to federal court. We do not 
question defense counsel's tactics or stewardship in doing 
so. However, neither can we ignore his tactics when 
conducting an inquiry into the fairness of applying the 
entire controversy doctrine. The entire controversy doctrine 
was never "intended to be a trap for the unwary." Joel, 688 
A.2d at 1041. In fact, preclusion is always a "remedy of last 
resort." Olds, 696 A.2d at 645. 
 
The limits of the doctrine are reached when its 
application "would result in significant unfairness or 
jeopardy to a clear presentation of the issues and a just 
result." Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 476 A.2d at 260. 
Indeed, "[i]mplicit in the development of the entire 
controversy doctrine is the recognition that economies and 
the efficient administration of justice should not be 
achieved at the expense of these paramount concerns." Id. 
"[B]ecause the entire controversy doctrine is an equitable 
principle, its applicability is left to judicial discretion based 
on the particular circumstances inherent in a given case." 
Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad , 662 
A.2d 523, 530 (N.J. 1995)(citations omitted).10 
 
Here, we hold that the district court exceeded the limits 
of the entire controversy doctrine by stretching it to apply 
to an ERISA action under the circumstances of this case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The specific holding in Mystic Isle was overruled in Olds v. Donnelly, 
696 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1997). Prior to Olds v. Donnelly, it appeared that the 
entire controversy doctrine required that a claim of legal malpractice 
arising from an attorney's representation of his client in a lawsuit be 
asserted in the underlying lawsuit in which the legal malpractice arose. 
Realizing the havoc to the attorney-client relationship that follows from 
the application of the doctrine in such a situation, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that "the entire controversy doctrine no longer 
compels the assertion of a legal malpractice claim in an underlying 
action that gives rise to the claim." Id. at 643. However, the general 
principle of law from Mystic Isle referred to above is still valid. 
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V. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we will reverse the district 
court and remand for further proceedings. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I dissent because I believe the district court's conclusion, 
though harsh, is correct: the entire controversy doctrine 
applies. The doctrine bars successive lawsuits that"arise 
from related facts or the same transaction or series of 
transactions. It is the core set of facts that provides the link 
between distinct claims against the same or different 
parties and triggers the requirement that they be 
determined in one proceeding." DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 
494, 502 (N.J. 1995). If the litigants are "likely to have to 
engage in additional litigation in order to conclusively 
dispose of their respective bundles of rights and liabilities" 
arising from the same series of transactions, the doctrine 
applies irrespective of whether the claims or issues are 
"independent cause[s] of action by technical common law 
definition or independent claim[s] which, in the abstract, 
[are] separately adjudicable." O'Shea v. Amoco Oil Co., 886 
F.2d 584, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Both suits derive from the same event: the injury Mr. 
Fornarotto suffered at his place of employment. The 
personal injury suit sought damages for the physical 
injuries he suffered in that accident; the ERISA suit sought 
compensation for the wages he lost when he became totally 
disabled as a result of those injuries. In the personal injury 
suit, Mr. Fornarotto would have had to prove the extent of 
his injuries, including his total disability. In the ERISA suit, 
he would again have had to prove that his injuries left him 
totally disabled. Thus, both lawsuits stem from the same 
core set of facts: the extent of his injury resulting from the 
accident. When the accident occurred, the "bundles of 
rights" that accrued to Fornarotto included compensation 
for both (1) physical injury and (2) lost incom e resulting 
from that accident. I continue to believe that the entire 
controversy doctrine required Mr. Fornarotto to dispose of 
those rights in one proceeding. 
 
Indeed, everyone acknowledges that the two suits share 
common facts. Although the personal injury suit involved 
issues of negligence that were not implicated in the ERISA 
suit, that is irrelevant. "The entire controversy doctrine 
does not require commonality of legal issues. Rather, the 
determinative consideration is whether distinct claims are 
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aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise 
from interrelated facts." DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 504. 
Fornarotto admits that his accident caused his disability 
and is therefore common to both lawsuits. 
 
The entire controversy doctrine has three objectives: 
"(1) to encourage the comprehensive and conclus ive 
determination of a legal controversy; (2) to achie ve party 
fairness . . . and (3) to promote judicial economy  and 
efficiency by avoiding fragmented, multiple and duplicative 
litigation." Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 761 (3d Cir. 
1997). The opinion of the court does not discuss thefirst 
and third factors, which weigh in New-Jersey American's 
favor. 
 
In arguing the "fairness" factor, Fornarotto's attorney 
relies mainly on equitable considerations, but does not cite 
a single case in which a New Jersey court assumed that the 
entire controversy doctrine was applicable but declined to 
enforce it out of "fairness" to one of the parties. Neither I 
nor the majority has found one either. "Fairness in the 
application of the entire controversy doctrine focuses on the 
litigation posture of the respective parties and whether all 
of their claims and defenses could be most soundly and 
appropriately litigated and disposed of in a single 
comprehensive adjudication." DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 507. 
Fornarotto's personal injury suit was pending in the state 
court for six years. In settling that suit, Fornarotto released 
New-Jersey American from "any and all actions, causes of 
actions, claims, demands, costs, loss of services, expenses 
and compensation on account of, or in anyway growing out 
of" his injuries in the accident. (App. at 49.) To require 
relitigation of those same injuries in the ERISA suit is 
unfair to New-Jersey American and would certainly 
frustrate judicial economy.1 
 
It could be argued that it would be unfair to bar the 
ERISA suit because, at the time Fornarotto filed the 
personal injury suit, he did not know he was disabled or 
that New-Jersey American would deny him disability 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Judicial economy is not merely to save us work; it redounds to all 
other suits and litigants who are thus denied attention and whose 
causes meanwhile must remain untried. 
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benefits. Again, this is true but irrelevant. The entire 
controversy doctrine does not take effect until one suit is 
finally determined. Rycoline Products, Inc. v. C & W 
Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1997). Upon learning 
that New-Jersey American denied him disability benefits, 
Fornarotto should have simply amended his pending 
personal injury suit to add an ERISA claim. Instead, he 
chose to file a separate ERISA action in the same court on 
September 5, 1995. New-Jersey American removed that 
ERISA suit on October 27, 1995, and the parties settled the 
personal injury suit in November, 1996. Thus, two separate 
lawsuits arising out of the same event were pending in the 
same court for almost two months, and the ERISA suit then 
sat in a different court for over one year. This is precisely 
the type of fragmented litigation the entire controversy 
doctrine was meant to preclude. 
 
Fornarotto's attorney had a statutory duty to bring the 
overlap to the court's attention when he first filed the 
ERISA suit, but he failed to do so. "A plaintiff who fails to 
allow the trial court the opportunity to supervise the entire 
controversy risks losing the right to bring that claim later." 
Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 662 
A.2d 523, 530 (N.J. 1995). Fornarotto should not be saved 
by his argument that New-Jersey American avoided that 
same statutory duty by removing the ERISA suit before 
filing an answer in state court. New-Jersey American had a 
procedural right to remove, and removal does not bar 
operation of the entire controversy doctrine.2 Indeed, in 
Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co., 993 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 
1993), we upheld summary judgment in favor of a 
defendant who removed a suit to federal court and then 
claimed it was barred by the entire controversy doctrine. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I am not without compassion for Mr. Fornarotto. Whatever legitimate 
rationale there may be that led his attorney to risk the ERISA action by 
filing a separate suit, it is not apparent from this record. Moreover, the 
timing of the removal, the first settlement, the letters exchanged (see 
Maj. Op. n.9), and the motion for summary judgment lead me to believe 
that Mr. Fornarotto suffered a procedural "sucker punch," from which he 
was unprotected, and by which he was denied disability benefits. The 
profession of law is reduced to a mere trade if not practiced with 
informed zeal and honor; I see a shortage of both here. 
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Although the defendant in Petrocelli did not know of the 
previous suit when it removed the later suit, there, as here, 
the plaintiff was aware that a similar suit was pending 
when he filed the second suit, but failed to inform the state 
court as required. Id. at 28. 
 
For these reasons, which are essentially those given by 
the district court in its opinion, I dissent. 
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